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THIRD-PARTY RELIEF FOR MUNICIPAL DEBTORS: 
“NECESSITY” IN THE CHAPTER 9 CONTEXT 
ABSTRACT 
“Third-party releases” are a longstanding—although non-statutory—form 
of relief in chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. Bankruptcy courts use them to relieve 
non-debtors of liability for certain debts. For example, directors of a debtor 
corporation might propose to contribute assets to a settlement fund in exchange 
for tort plaintiffs giving up their claims against the directors. Although circuits 
are currently split on whether to allow third-party relief at all, the majority 
agree that it falls within bankruptcy courts’ § 105(a) equitable authority in 
certain circumstances. Courts make this determination using a variety of tests, 
most notably the “Dow Corning factors.” 
With the recent uptick in municipal bankruptcy cases, some debtors have 
attempted to extend third-party relief to chapter 9 bankruptcy. These cases fall 
roughly into two categories. In the first, a state provides funds to assist in a 
reorganization in return for certain creditors giving up claims against the state. 
In the second, a city attempts to relieve its police officers of liability for civil 
rights violations by including injunctions against the plaintiffs in the city’s plan 
of reorganization. If the officers themselves had filed for bankruptcy, these 
lawsuits would be nondischargeable claims arising from personal physical 
injury under § 523(a)(6). While courts have so far applied the Dow Corning 
factors correctly to the first category of cases, a series of decisions in the Fifth 
and Ninth Circuits have led to a much more lenient standard (the “necessity 
standard”) for the second. 
This Comment argues that the second series of decisions has ignored 
fundamental limitations on the permissibility of third-party relief. First, courts 
should not allow it to be used as a loophole for discharging otherwise non-
dischargeable debts. Second, by removing substantive limitations on third-party 
relief the necessity standard both ignores the limits of a bankruptcy court’s 
equitable powers and incentivizes over-reliance by municipalities. This 
Comment advocates discarding the necessity standard and returning to 
established standards that limit third-party relief to situations in which it is 
consistent with the Code.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In October 2016, Korey King, a San Bernardino, CA resident, filed suit 
against three city police officers.1 In his complaint, King alleged that the officers 
had violated his civil rights, and King requested damages under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.2 He did not include the city as a defendant.3 However, King soon 
received notice that his suit had been stayed pending the resolution of San 
Bernardino’s chapter 9 bankruptcy case.4 The confirmation of the city’s plan of 
reorganization several months later brought even worse news.5 Because San 
Bernardino had undertaken the officers’ defense in King’s case, California law 
obligated the city to indemnify them for any damages awarded.6  
San Bernardino, accordingly, had proposed in its plan of reorganization to 
enjoin King and numerous other civil rights plaintiffs from collecting damages 
on their claims against indemnified police officers.7 The city claimed that this 
injunction—referred to as a “third-party release”—was necessary to free up 
funds for its continued operations, including a $56.5 million “Police Resources 
Plan” targeting the city’s high crime rates.8 The bankruptcy court agreed with 
San Bernardino and approved its plan of reorganization.9 In October 2017 the 
district court affirmed that King’s suit was subject to the plan injunction.10 
King’s right to receive compensation was effectively erased by the bankruptcy 
of a city that was not a party to his suit.  
Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code applies to municipalities.11 
While municipal bankruptcies have historically been rare,12 the recent recession 
 
 1 King v. San Bernardino Police Officers, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102424 *1 (C.D. Cal. 2017). 
 2 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 3 King, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102424, at *1. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. 46, 49–50 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2017). See CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 825 (Deering 2018); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825.2(b) (Deering 2018). 
 7 King, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102424, at *1. 
 8 In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 61. 
 9 Id. at 63. 
 10 King, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102424, at *14. 
 11 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012). A municipality is a “political subdivision or public agency or 
instrumentality of a State.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2012). This includes cities, towns, villages, boroughs, 
townships, incorporated authorities, and commissions. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 109.04[3][a][i]–[ii] (Alan 
N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010). 
 12 John Patrick Hunt, Taxes and Ability to Pay in Municipal Bankruptcy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 515, 516 
(2016) (citing Juliet M. Moringiello, Chapter 9 Plan Confirmation Standards and the Role of State Choices, 37 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 71, 72 (2015)). 
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prompted several major cities,13 a county,14 and a host of other entities to seek 
relief under chapter 9.15 Many of these financially troubled municipalities 
entered bankruptcy bearing obligations to indemnify their employees against 
personal liability for acts committed in their professional capacities.16 Chapter 9 
generally gives debtors great flexibility to modify their obligations in tailoring 
plans of reorganization, without balancing the interests of creditors.17 
Accordingly, several of these municipalities, including San Bernardino, sought 
to extend the Code’s protections to their indemnified employees.18  
A bankruptcy court’s ability to release non-debtor parties from debts is a 
powerful but infrequently-invoked measure.19 Debtors may offer what this 
Comment will refer to as “third-party relief” to creditors in exchange for 
continued financing or consent to less-favorable terms,20 or to their own officers 
who play an important role in reorganization.21 Circuits are currently split on 
whether this relief is permissible under chapter 11, with the majority allowing it 
in certain unusual circumstances.22 The seven Dow Corning factors form the 
 
 13 See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 277 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); In re City of San 
Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 48; In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 783 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (June 28, 2012); 
In re City of Vallejo, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4433, at *53 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2008). 
 14 In re Jefferson County, 491 B.R. 277, 283 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2013). 
 15 See Andrew B. Dawson, Beyond the Great Divide: Federalism Concerns in Municipal Insolvency, 11 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 34 (2017) (noting the “recent municipal insolvency crisis” involving “an 
unprecedented number of municipal bankruptcy filings”); Bankrupt Cities, Municipalities List and Map, 
GOVERNING (Sep. 14, 2017), http://www.governing.com/gov-data/municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-and-
defaults.html (noting that 61 municipalities have filed for bankruptcy since 2010). 
 16 See, e.g., In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 54 (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(a), obligating a 
public entity “to indemnify its employees for judgments against the employees based upon employee acts or 
omissions arising within the scope of employment”). 
 17 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010). 
 18 See In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 48–49 (seeking an injunction preventing civil rights 
plaintiffs from collecting on judgments against city police officers); In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 262–63 
(seeking to discharge civil rights claims against city police officers). 
 19 See generally 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1141.02[5][c] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
16th ed. 2010). (“Nonconsensual Release of Third Parties”). 
 20 Deryck A. Palmer et al., Third Party Releases Survive Supreme Court’s Decision in Travelers 
Indemnity Co. v. Bailey, 5 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 554, 555, 562 (2009) (“[R]eleases of claims against officers, 
directors or other employees may be critical to a debtor’s successful continuation of business after confirmation 
of its plan.”). See, e.g., Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that “reorganization hinge[d] on the debtor being free from … suits against parties who would have 
indemnity … claims”). 
 21 Palmer et al., supra note 20. See, e.g., Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow 
Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2001) (approving plan enjoining claims against debtor’s shareholders 
and insurers). 
 22 See, e.g., In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 52 (noting the circuit split); Resorts Int’l v. 
Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the specific rule in 11 
U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) “displace[d]” the bankruptcy courts’ general “equitable powers” granted by 11 U.S.C. 
§ 105 (2012), and listing Ninth Circuit precedent); In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657–58 (holding that 
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most notable standard.23 The Ninth Circuit, which has adopted the minority 
position, has also indicated that its prohibition of third-party relief in chapter 11 
bankruptcy will not extend to chapter 9 cases.24 
In the recent wave of municipal bankruptcies, several cities unable to 
indemnify law enforcement officers for civil rights lawsuits instead sought third-
party relief in the form of injunctions against the plaintiffs.25 Drawing from 
chapter 11 case law, courts in these cases have converged on a standard basing 
the availability of third-party relief on its “necessity” to reorganization.26 As a 
result, municipal debtors now enjoy a great degree of freedom to modify their 
employees’ obligations to third parties. These decisions, however, have not 
addressed two important considerations that should limit the availability of 
third-party relief.  
First, bankruptcy courts have failed to consider whether they possess the 
authority to release third parties from debts that would be nondischargeable in 
the third-party’s own bankruptcies. These include debts listed under § 523(a) as 
“exceptions to discharge,” such as those arising from “fraud . . . embezzlement, 
or larceny,” “domestic support obligations,” “willful or malicious injury” to 
another’s person, or for benefits obtained under “false pretenses.”27 The § 523(a) 
exceptions reflect a Congressional policy of “not allowing a debtor to use the 
bankruptcy system to avoid debts when the debtor acted wrongfully in incurring 
those debts.”28 
Second, courts have not justified the introduction of a new, necessity-based, 
standard for chapter 9. The constitutional status of municipalities precludes 
 
11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) only limits the scope of the debtor’s discharge, not a court’s authority to issue 
injunctions affecting third parties under 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012)). 
 23 In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657–58. 
 24 Deocampo v. Potts, 836 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that its reasoning in In re 
Lowenschuss precluding third-party relief in chapter 11 “does not apply in Chapter 9 proceedings”). 
 25 See V.W. v. City of Vallejo, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145 at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“This civil rights 
lawsuit . . . against the City of Vallejo . . . and its Chief of Police . . . alleges that the City’s police officers killed 
the decedent while they were using a taser gun during his arrest.”); Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1137 (“Plaintiffs 
asserted excessive-force and other constitutional claims against the Officers.”); In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 
at 263 (“[The plaintiffs’] lawsuits allege . . .officers’ various violations of their constitutional rights”); In re City 
of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 50 (“[Plaintiffs] alleged the officers had violated their civil rights”). 
 26 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266–67 (applying a test from In re Dow Corning Corp. to hold that 
Detroit must show the “necessity” of third-party relief “to … the success of the plan”). 
 27 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4), (5), (6) (2012). 
 28 Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, With Malice Toward One–Defining Nondischargeability of Debts for Willful 
and Malicious Injury Under § 523(A)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 151, 151 (2016). 
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“failure” in the chapter 11 sense, removing any objective measure of necessity.29 
Furthermore, the ubiquity of indemnification obligations will lead most 
municipal debtors to request, and qualify for, third-party relief, destroying its 
status as a dramatic measure reserved for unusual circumstances.30 This will 
invite abuse by allowing municipal officials to regularly avoid debts they could 
not discharge individually, extending municipal bankruptcy beyond the bounds 
contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code.  
This Comment begins by outlining the structure and goals of chapter 9 
bankruptcy, as well as several state-law alternatives available to municipalities. 
Next, it discusses the prevalence of municipal indemnification obligations and 
the circumstances which give rise to these obligations. This Comment then 
provides an overview of the case law governing third party relief in chapter 11, 
which courts have imported into chapter 9 cases. It continues by examining in 
detail the use of third-party relief to shield police officers from liability for civil 
rights violations in recent chapter 9 cases. 
This Comment establishes that the § 523(a) exceptions to discharge overrule 
bankruptcy’s general policy of giving the debtor a “fresh start,” which is also the 
justification for third-party relief. Next, it argues that the necessity standard is 
not appropriate for chapter 9 because it removes crucial limiting factors from 
Dow Corning, and because a municipality’s indissolubility precludes an 
objective measure of necessity. Combined with the ubiquity of municipal 
indemnification obligations, these omissions leave a municipal debtor with 
almost no substantive limitations on the availability of third-party relief. 
Finally, this Comment examines the Dow Corning factors’ suitability for 
municipal bankruptcy and conclude that they reflect basic Code requirements 
equally applicable to chapters 11 and 9. Because so little precedent exists, courts 
can easily resume restricting third-party relief to truly unusual circumstances. 
This Comment also notes possible legislative solutions. For instance, Congress 
could expand the scope of chapter 9 if it decides that protecting public 
employees is crucial to successful reorganization. States could also amend their 
 
 29 See In re Addison Community Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 649 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994) (quoting 
“[N]either Congress nor the courts can change the existing system of government in this country . . . . One of 
the powers reserved to the states is the power to create and govern municipalities.”); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 
¶ 900.01[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has upheld 
municipal debt adjustment legislation . . . at least in part on the premise that the legislation involves no possibility 
of . . . liquidation of [a municipality’s] assets.”). 
 30 For instance, a recent study found that “police officers are virtually always indemnified.” Joanna C. 
Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 885 (2014). 
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indemnification laws to directly protect employees of financially-troubled 
municipalities. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Chapter 9 Bankruptcy and Municipal Alternatives 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy “permit[s] a financially distressed public entity to seek 
protection from its creditors.”31 It is primarily in this context that the necessity 
standard and the possibility of releasing third parties from nondischargeable 
debts arises. However, financially distressed municipalities have additional non-
bankruptcy options, so this section will place chapter 9 in the context of state 
solutions, such as receiverships. 
1. Overview of Chapter 9 Bankruptcy 
In contrast to the other Code chapters, chapter 9 provides “systematic 
advantages for debtor municipalities,”32 such as limited control by the 
bankruptcy court,33 little consideration of creditors’ interests,34 and the debtor 
municipality’s exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization.35 These 
advantages are consequently reserved for a very narrow class of entities: 
insolvent municipalities that states have “specifically authorized” to be 
debtors.36 Currently, twenty-seven states authorize at least some municipalities 
 
 31 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010). 
 32 Heith M. Frost, States as Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific Authorization, and 
Protection of Municipal Economic Health, 84 MISS. L.J. 817, 820 (2015). See also Elizabeth M. Watkins, In 
Defense of the Chapter 9 Option: Exploring the Promise of a Municipal Bankruptcy as a Mechanism for 
Structural Political Reform, 39 J. LEGIS. 89, 93 (2013) (characterizing the benefits of chapter 9 bankruptcy as 
“similar to those offered . . . under Chapter 11, but more extensive”).  
 33 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[2][c] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) 
(quoting In re Willacy County Water Control & Improvement District No. 1, 36 F. Supp. 36, 39 (S.D. Tex. 
1940)); 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012) (“[U]nless the debtor consents or the plan so provides, the court may not . . . 
interfere with–(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; (2) any of the property of revenues 
of the debtor; or (3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-producing property.”). 
 34 Christopher J. Tyson, Exploring the Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 
678 (2014). 
 35 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2012) (“The debtor shall file a plan for the adjustment of the debtor’s debts . . . with 
the petition [or] at such later time as the court fixes.”).  
 36 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) (“An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title . . . only if such 
entity . . . is specifically authorized . . . to be a debtor . . . by State law”). 
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to be debtors.37 Because of the specific authorization requirement, states lacking 
such laws prohibit municipalities from becoming debtors by default.38 
Many of chapter 9’s unique characteristics stem from Tenth Amendment 
federalism considerations, which prevent bankruptcy courts from interfering 
with or usurping state sovereignty.39 The approval requirement, noted above, 
avoids this problem by allowing states to “[invite] the intervention of the 
bankruptcy power.”40 A chapter 9 case starts when an insolvent municipality 
files a petition for relief with the bankruptcy court.41 In chapter 9, “insolvent” 
means that the debtor is “generally not paying” or “unable to pay” its debts as 
they become due.42 While the case is pending, the debtor may continue its 
operations and incur new debts, subject to limited court oversight.43 After the 
municipality has proposed a plan of reorganization, the bankruptcy court largely 
resigns to approving its plan of reorganization or dismissing the case.44  
Tenth Amendment considerations also give rise to important conceptual 
differences between chapter 9 and chapter 11 bankruptcy. Because only states 
 
 37 CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, MUNICIPALITIES IN DISTRESS? HOW STATES AND INVESTORS DEAL WITH 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES app. B (2012), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/files/2013/12/chapmanandcutlerchapter9.pdf. See also Tom D. Hoffman, Note, Municipal Bankruptcy 
Authorization Under Chapter 9: A Call for Uniformity Among States, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 215, 223–
25 (2014) (outlining state policies regarding municipal bankruptcy). 
 38 CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, supra note 37. 
 39 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[2][c] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) 
(noting the “severe” limitations placed upon bankruptcy courts by the Tenth Amendment and related Supreme 
Court cases.). See generally Colin McGrath, Municipal Bankruptcy and the Limits of Federalism, 18 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1265, 1283–96 (2016) (explaining chapter 9 restrictions in light of Tenth Amendment doctrines of 
commandeering, coercion, and comity). 
 40 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938). See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) (“An entity may be a 
debtor under chapter 9 of this title . . . only if such entity . . . is specifically authorized . . . to be a debtor . . . by 
State law”). 
 41 11 U.S.C. § 921 (2012); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 921.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 16th ed. 2010). 
 42 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2012). See also 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.02[2][c] (Alan N. Resnick 
& Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010). 
 43 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[2][b]–[c] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 
2010). 
 44 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) 
(“If the case is not successful, or if the plan cannot be implemented as confirmed, the court’s remedy is limited 
to dismissal of the case pursuant to section 930.”); In re Willacy County Water Control & Improv. Dist., 36 F. 
Supp. at 38–39 (“The court is merely authorized to determine insolvency, or inability to meet debts as they 
mature, and whether the plan proposed is in accordance with the provisions of the statute [and the criteria for 
plan approval].”). 
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can create or dissolve municipalities,45 chapter 9 has no analog to the 
“conversion” of a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 for liquidation.46 Without a 
liquidation option, the confirmation requirement that a plan be in the “best 
interests of the creditors” simply requires it to provide a better alternative to 
creditors than individual recovery efforts outside of bankruptcy.47  
As in cases brought under other chapters of the Code, a bankruptcy court in 
a chapter 9 case has “broad [equitable] authority to modify creditor-debtor 
relationships.”48 Section 105(a) in particular authorizes courts to “issue any 
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the 
provisions of this title.”49 The “Grand Bargain” reached in Detroit’s bankruptcy 
case between the city, pension plan claimants and trustees, the Detroit Institute 
of Arts, and the state of Michigan provides an excellent example of the 
bankruptcy court’s ability to implement creative solutions that balance 
competing interests.50 However, as the Third Circuit has pointed out, § 105(a) 
“does not create substantive rights that would otherwise be unavailable under 
the Bankruptcy Code.”51 For example, a court’s equitable authority is limited by 
the confirmation requirement that a plan of reorganization must comply with all 
applicable Code provisions.52 Chapter 9’s confirmation requirements also 
include § 943(b)(4) and (6), which dictate that a plan of reorganization cannot 
require actions that violate applicable state or nonbankruptcy federal law.53  
 
 45 See In re Addison Community Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. at 649 (quoting “[N]either Congress nor the 
courts can change the existing system of government in this country . . . . One of the powers reserved to the 
states is the power to create and govern municipalities.”). 
 46 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has upheld municipal debt adjustment legislation … at least in part on the premise that 
the legislation involves no possibility of . . . liquidation of [a municipality’s] assets.”); In re Richmond Unified 
School Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 225 (1991) (“A municipal unit cannot liquidate its assets to satisfy its creditors . . . . 
Therefore, the primary purpose of Chapter 9 is to allow [it] to continue operating while it adjusts or refinances 
its creditor[s’] claims”). 
 47 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[7][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010); 
11 U.S.C. § 943(7) (2018). On municipal creditors’ remedies outside of bankruptcy, see C. Scott Pryor, 
Municipal Bankruptcy: When Doing Less is Doing Best, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 85, 122–23 (2014). 
 48 United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990). 
 49 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2018). 
 50 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 169–70. See generally Maureen B. Collins, Pensions or Paintings: 
The Detroit Institute of Arts from Bankruptcy to Grand Bargain, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2015) (providing 
an overview of the Detroit Institute of Arts’ role in the Grand Bargain).  
 51 Gillman v. Continental Airlines (In re Continental Airlines), 203 F.3 203, 211 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
 52 11 U.S.C. § 943(a)–(b) (2012). 
 53 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4), (6) (2018). See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 943.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry 
J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010). 
MORBIDELLI COMMENT_PROOFS 1/14/2019 9:15 AM 
2019] THIRD-PARTY RELIEF FOR MUNICIPAL DEBTORS 233 
Several Code provisions outside of chapter 9 are also relevant to an analysis 
of third-party relief in chapter 9 cases. The most relevant of these is § 524(e),54 
which some circuits have held limits a court’s authority to grant relief to non-
debtors.55 Section 524(e) disclaims any effect on other parties’ liabilities from 
the discharge of a debtor’s obligation.56 The majority of circuits have interpreted 
this provision narrowly to restrict only the effects of the discharge of any 
particular debt, not the bankruptcy court’s ability to modify other parties’ 
obligations.57 For example, discharging an individual’s debt would not affect a 
guarantor’s liability on that debt. However, § 524(e) would not prevent the court 
from separately releasing the guarantor from liability. 
Chapter 9 also does not incorporate § 523(a), entitled “exceptions to 
discharge.”58 Section 523(a) states, in part, that “[a] discharge under [this title] 
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . for willful and 
malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another 
entity[.]”59 Other excepted debts include those “for fraud or defalcation while 
acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny; . . . for a domestic 
support obligation;” or “for death or personal injury caused by the debtor’s 
operation of a motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft if such operation was unlawful 
because the debtor was intoxicated.”60 Despite the general bankruptcy policy 
favoring dischargeability of debts,61 this section reflects a congressional policy 
of “not allowing a debtor to use the bankruptcy system to avoid debts when the 
 
 54 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) (“[D]ischarge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other 
entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.”); 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (incorporating 
provisions of other Code chapters). 
 55 See In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1402 (holding that the specific rule in 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) 
“displace[d]” the bankruptcy courts’ general “equitable powers” granted by 11 U.S.C. § 105 and listing 
consistent Ninth Circuit precedent). 
 56 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) (“[D]ischarge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other 
entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt”); 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (incorporating provisions 
of other Code chapters). 
 57 Compare In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657–58 (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) only 
limits the scope of the debtor’s discharge, not a court’s equitable authority to issue injunctions affecting third 
parties under 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012)), with In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1402 (holding that the specific rule 
in 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) “displace[d]” the bankruptcy courts’ general “equitable powers” granted by 11 
U.S.C. § 105 (2012), and listing consistent Ninth Circuit precedent). 
 58 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012) (applicable to chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13). 
 59 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012). See also V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *6–7 (citing 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(6) (2012) and its application in Gee v. Hammond (In re Gee), 173 B.R. 189, 193 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) 
and other cases). 
 60 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4)–(5), (9) (2018). 
 61 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (referring to the “general policy of discharge” in the interest 
of providing debtors a “fresh start”). 
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debtor acted wrongfully in incurring those debts.”62 The Supreme Court even 
held in Archer v. Warner that pre-petition settlements releasing the debtor from 
liability in suits that would have given rise to non-dischargeable debts fall under 
the scope of § 523(a).63 According to Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous 
court in Grogan v. Garner, “Congress evidently concluded that the creditors’ 
interest in recovering full payment of debts in these categories outweighed the 
debtors’ interest in a complete fresh start.”64 
2. Alternatives to Chapter 9 
A financially distressed municipality’s unsecured creditors generally have 
few options for repayment outside of bankruptcy.65 Because a municipality’s 
“principal asset . . . is its taxing power,” as the Supreme Court once noted, a 
“municipal security is merely a draft on [its] good faith in exercising” that 
power.66 States also generally prohibit the procurement of judicial liens on 
public property.67 A creditor may have the right to petition for a writ of 
mandamus “to compel the levying of authorized taxes” in the event of default,68 
but in practice this is merely “an empty right to litigate.”69 For example, the 
city’s experts in In re Detroit estimated that, ignoring the difficulty in obtaining 
the necessary voter approval, raising taxes would simply precipitate the erosion 
of the city’s tax base.70 The experts predicted that these effects would cancel 
each other out, producing no net revenue gains with which to pay creditors.71 
Most states provide an alternative to bankruptcy for financially-troubled 
municipalities in the form of receiverships.72 Once state officials determine that 
a municipality’s situation is sufficiently dire, they may appoint a receiver to take 
 
 62 Radwan, supra note 28. 
 63 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.33 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) (citing 
Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 323 (2003)) (holding that although a “settlement agreement and releases may 
have worked a kind of novation, . . . that fact does not bar [the creditor] from showing that the settlement debt 
arose out of false pretences, a false representation, or actual fraud, and consequently is nondischargeable”). 
 64 Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287. 
 65 Pryor, supra note 47. 
 66 Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Ashbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 509–10 (1942). 
 67 See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 213 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6021(1) (2012)); 
Parker v. Klochko Equipment Rental Co., 590 F.2d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting the “well-understood and 
established” principle “that it is contrary to public policy to allow private liens on public property”). 
 68 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 213 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6093(1) (2012)). 
 69 Id. at 215 (citing Faitoute Iron & Steel Co., 316 U.S. at 510). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Lyle Kossis, Note, Examining the Conflict Between Municipal Receivership and Local Autonomy, 98 
VA. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (2012). 
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over its operations until the municipality is adequately rehabilitated.73 The 
receiver has largely unrestricted power during this period to modify a 
municipality’s obligations, fire employees, and sell its property.74 A defaulting 
municipality’s secured creditors, including bondholders, may alternatively be 
permitted to obtain a court-appointed receiver, who will attempt to raise 
sufficient revenue to repay its debts.75 Authors have criticized municipal 
receivership for allowing drastic measures and undermining local self-
governance, and courts have acknowledged that chapter 9 bankruptcy may be 
more desirable for creditors and municipalities alike.76 
B. Municipal Indemnification Obligations 
The literature regarding municipal obligations to indemnify employees 
centers around police officers liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for civil rights 
violations.77 Section 1983 subjects an official acting “under color of” state 
authority to civil liability for violating any person’s Constitutional “rights, 
privileges, or immunities.”78 Section 1983 advances the twin goals of 
compensation and deterrence.79 Because the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
does not generally protect municipalities unless they are acting as “arms of the 
state,” they may also be subject to suit under § 1983.80  
The counterpoising doctrine of qualified immunity comes into play as well, 
shielding “government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
 
 73 Kossis, supra note 72. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See, e.g., In re Pleasant View Utility Dist., 24 B.R. 632, 637 n.4 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (citing 
TENN. CODE § 7-82-505 providing municipal bondholders with statutory liens and prescribing receivership in 
case of default).  
 76 Kossis, supra note 72; In re Pleasant View Utility Dist., 24 B.R. at 637 n.4 (citing In re North & South 
Shenango Joint Muni. Auth., 14 B.R. 414, 421 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981) on the inferiority of creditor-initiated 
receiverships to chapter 9 bankruptcy). 
 77 See generally Schwartz, supra note 30 (providing a doctrinal overview of police indemnification and 
an empirical study of its prevalence); Martin A. Schwartz, Should Juries be Informed That Municipality Will 
Indemnify Officer’s § 1983 Liability for Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 866 IOWA L. REV. 1209 (2001).  
 78 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 79 Schwartz, supra note 30 (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 727 (1999) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“like other tort causes of action, it is designed to provide compensation for injuries 
arising from the violation of legal duties, and thereby, of course, to deter future violations.”)).  
 80 Northern Ins. Co. v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (“refus[ing] to extend sovereign 
immunity to counties” because “only States and arms of the State possess immunity from suits authorized by 
federal law”). 
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have known.”81 As an “immunity to suit,” the doctrine “ensure[s] that 
‘insubstantial claims’ against government officials [will] be resolved prior to 
discovery.”82 Thus, § 1983 claims resulting in damage awards have likely 
survived assertions of qualified immunity.83 
The deterrence prong of § 1983 assumes that imposing monetary penalties 
will dissuade officials from violating civil rights.84 Indemnification dampens 
this effect by using public funds to pay damage awards, ensuring that the 
employees themselves will not suffer financial loss. However, proponents argue 
that without indemnification the specter of liability will make officers hesitant 
to “zealously enforce” the law, even with the partial shield of qualified 
immunity.85 Because officers often lack the means to satisfy judgments against 
them, indemnification also advances § 1983’s compensatory goal.86 To these 
ends, many states and local governments have passed statutes and ordinances 
obligating municipalities to defend or indemnify their employees against certain 
lawsuits.87 Other municipalities may incur indemnification obligations by 
entering into collective bargaining agreements with employee organizations,88 
 
 81 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) 
(rejecting a rigid framework for applying qualified immunity and noting its role in balancing the “need to hold 
public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”). 
 82 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 231. 
 83 See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 
3–4 (2015–2016) (describing recent “constitutional stagnation,” where many cases with the potential to develop 
constitutional rights doctrines are instead dismissed due to qualified immunity); John C. Williams, Qualifying 
Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2012) (positing that overly-protective application of 
qualified immunity was responsible for the lack of First Amendment cases regarding Iraq war protests). 
 84 Schwartz, supra note 30, at 892 (citing City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“like 
other tort causes of action, it is designed to provide compensation for injuries arising from the violation of legal 
duties, and thereby, of course, to deter future violations.”)). 
 85 See id. at 887 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (“fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but 
the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials] in the unflinching discharge of their duties.’”)); In 
re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 55 (quoting Sinclair v. Arnebergh, 36 Cal. Rptr. 810, 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1964) (justifying California’s police indemnification statute)). 
 86 Schwartz, supra note 30, at 952 (explaining why plaintiffs have often urged indemnification, even 
dropping requests for punitive damages in return). 
 87 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 905–06 n.93, 94 (providing examples of state and local indemnification 
laws in Ohio, Arizona, Texas, and Missouri); In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 50 (discussing Cal. 
Government Code § 825, requiring municipalities to “indemnify their employees for claims against them arising 
from the scope of their employment”). 
 88 See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266–67 (“[t]he City’s assumption of its contractual 
indemnity obligations will result in the City’s full payment of valid § 1983 claims against employees in their 
individual capacity”); In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 51 (noting that, although already obligated by 
state law, “[t]he settlements the City negotiated with its employee unions and the operative collective bargaining 
agreements required the City to reaffirm its obligation to indemnify the employees”). 
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or decide whether to indemnify on a “case by case” basis.89 In fact, some have 
argued that the system of municipal police indemnification is so widespread,90 
and municipalities are sufficiently unresponsive to its expense,91 as to virtually 
eliminate § 1983’s deterrent effect, thus functioning as a form of vicarious 
liability.92 
California’s indemnification statute is illustrative of state efforts to shield 
public employees:  
§ 825 (a) . . . [I]f an employee or former employee of a public entity 
requests the public entity to defend him . . . against any claim or action 
against him or her for an injury arising out of an act or omission 
occurring within the scope of his or her employment as an employee 
of the public entity . . . and the employee . . . reasonably cooperates in 
good faith in the defense of the claim or action, [or if] the public entity 
conducts the defense of an employee . . . against any claim or action 
with his or her reasonable good-faith cooperation, the public entity 
shall pay any judgment based thereon or any compromise or settlement 
of the claim or action to which the public entity has agreed.93 
  
[A] public entity is authorized to pay that part of a judgment that is for 
punitive or exemplary damages if the governing body of that public 
entity . . . finds all of the following: 
(1) The judgment is based on an act or omission of an employee 
. . . acting within the course and scope of his or her employment 
as an employee of the public entity. 
(2) At the time of the act giving rise to the liability, the 
employee . . . acted, or failed to act, in good faith, without actual 
malice and in the apparent best interests of the public entity. 
(3) Payment of the claim or judgment would be in the best 
interests of the public entity. 94 
§ 825.2 (b) If the public entity did not conduct his defense against the 
action or claim . . . an employee or former employee of a public entity 
may recover from the public entity . . . only if he establishes that the 
 
 89 Schwartz, supra note 30, at 906 n.96. 
 90 See id. at 885 (revealing results of a nationwide study indicated that “police officers are virtually always 
indemnified”). 
 91 Id. at 952 (arguing that “governments do not appear to be collecting enough information about lawsuits 
to make educated decisions about whether or how to reduce the police activities that prompt these suits”). 
 92 Id. (quoting Bd. County. Comm’re v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 436 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“states’ 
indemnification statutes ‘mimic respondeat superior by authorizing indemnification of employees found liable 
under § 1983 for actions within the scope of their employment.’”)). 
93 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(a) (2012). 
 94 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(b). 
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act or omission upon which the claim or judgment is based occurred 
within the scope of his employment as an employee of the public entity 
and the public entity fails to establish that he acted or failed to act 
because of actual fraud, corruption or actual malice or that he willfully 
failed or refused to conduct the defense of the claim or action in good 
faith[.]95 
The statute requires a municipality that undertakes the defense of a current or 
former employee in a suit arising from the employee’s scope of duty to pay any 
judgment or settlement amount reached therein.96 If the municipality does not 
defend the employee, it must still pay any judgment or settlement unless the 
employee acted “because of fraud, corruption, or actual malice” or failed to 
“conduct the defense in good faith.”97 The statute also permits, but does not 
mandate, municipal payment of punitive or exemplary damages in certain 
circumstances.98  
Despite the widespread protection of public employees, this author has not 
found any opinion deciding whether municipal indemnification obligations 
(contractual or statutory) are dischargeable in chapter 9 bankruptcy. California’s 
Eastern District Court came close to addressing the issue in V.W. v. City of 
Vallejo, a case related to the city of Vallejo’s bankruptcy.99 There, the court 
opined that municipal obligations to indemnify public employees arising pre-
confirmation were “arguably” dischargeable by the confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization.100 However, the court declined to rule on dischargeability in 
V.W., instead deciding the case on other grounds.101 The Ninth Circuit also noted 
in Deocampo v. Potts that a municipality’s obligation to indemnify does not arise 
under California law until it undertakes an employee’s defense.102 Because a 
municipal plan of reorganization can only affect debts arising before plan 
confirmation, the point at which state law or contract imposes an obligation will 
 
 95 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825.2(b). 
 96 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(a). 
 97 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825.2(b). See also Rivas v. City of Kerman, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 147, 151—55 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting California municipalities’ obligations towards employees under Cal. Government 
Code §§ 825 & 825.2 (2012)). 
 98 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(b), (f). 
 99 V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *21. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id.  
 102 Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1145 (noting that, because Vallejo did not actually become obligated to certain 
officers until after the plan confirmation date, their claims against the city for indemnification were not 
discharged). 
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set the baseline for its dischargeability.103 This uncertainty is only compounded 
when municipal debtors attempt to leverage their indemnification commitments 
to extend bankruptcy relief to public employees. 
D. Third-Party Relief  
Third-party relief originated in chapter 11 cases involving mass tort 
claims.104 As a court-created solution never explicitly endorsed by the Supreme 
Court, approaches to third-party relief remain fragmented by circuit.105 In the 
last decade, courts have extended the doctrine to municipal bankruptcy cases, 
while questioning the extent to which the limitations on third-party relief 
imposed by chapter 11 case law are transferable to chapter 9.106 
1. Third-Party Relief in Chapter 11 
In a chapter 11 bankruptcy case, a debtor may ask the court to release claims 
against related parties if doing so will help the debtor reorganize.107 This ability 
can be an important bargaining chip, allowing debtors to induce “lenders, equity 
investors, and other third parties” to provide necessary financing and “[agree] to 
participate in [the] plan.”108 Bankruptcy courts have “related to” jurisdiction 
over “suits between third parties which have an effect on the bankruptcy.”109 
However, § 524(e) of the Code provides that “discharge of a debt of the debtor 
does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other 
entity for, such debt.”110 Circuit courts are currently split on whether § 524(e) 
denies bankruptcy courts the authority to approve third-party relief under chapter 
 
 103 See 11 U.S.C. § 944(b) (2012). See also O’Loghlin v. County of Orange, 229 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 
2000) (holding that plaintiff’s ADA violation claims arising pre-confirmation were discharged, while an 
identical claim arising post-confirmation from the same “series of violations” was not). 
 104 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 654–55. 
 105 See In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1402 (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) prohibits third-party 
relief); In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (holding that § 524(e) does not prohibit third-party relief and 
announcing a seven-factor standard); In re Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d at 214 (listing three “hallmarks of 
permissible non-consensual releases”); Palmer et al., supra note 20, at 555–56. 
 106 See In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 59–60 (distilling a new three-factor test based on necessity 
to the municipality’s reorganization). 
 107 Palmer et al., supra note 20. 
 108 Id. 
 109 In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 56–57 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307 
n.6 (explaining the scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012))); see also In re 
Pacor, Inc., 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984) (proposing that a “civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy” if “the 
outcome . . . could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.”). 
 110 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012). 
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11.111 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits hold that § 524(e) prohibits third-party relief 
entirely.112 The other circuits, however, agree that § 524(e) only limits the scope 
of a debtor’s bankruptcy discharge, and does not affect the bankruptcy court’s 
power to order other relief in chapter 11.113 Bankruptcy courts in these circuits 
use a variety of standards to determine whether “unusual circumstances” exist 
that justify the “dramatic measure” of third-party relief.114 
a. Dow Corning: Third-party Releases Allowable Under the Code 
The seven factors the Ninth Circuit applied in In re Dow Corning are typical 
of the majority standards. The Dow Corning factors considering whether: 
(1) There is an identity of interests between the debtor and the third 
party, usually an indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the 
non-debtor is, in essence, a suit against the debtor . . . ; (2) The 
non-debtor has contributed substantial assets to the reorganization; (3) 
The injunction is essential to reorganization, namely, the 
reorganization hinges on the debtor being free from indirect suits 
against parties who would have indemnity or contribution claims 
against the debtor; (4) The impacted class . . . has overwhelmingly 
voted to accept the plan; (5) The plan provides a mechanism to pay for 
. . . the class . . . affected by the injunction; (6) The plan provides an 
opportunity for those claimants who choose not to settle to recover in 
full and; (7) The bankruptcy court made a record of specific factual 
findings that support its conclusions.”115  
Not all circuits require every factor to be present to justify third-party relief, and 
there is no consensus regarding which factors are more or less important than 
others.116 
 
 111 See, e.g., In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 52 (noting the circuit split); In re Lowenschuss, 67 
F.3d at 1402 (holding that the specific rule in 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) “displace[d]” the bankruptcy courts’ 
general “equitable powers” granted by 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012), and listing consistent Ninth Circuit precedent); 
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657–58 (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) only limits the scope of 
the debtor’s discharge, not a court’s equitable authority to issue injunctions affecting third parties under 11 
U.S.C. § 105 (2012)). 
 112 Palmer et al., supra note 20, at 555–56. 
 113 Id. 
 114 In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (“[O]ur sister circuits have considered a number of factors, 
which are summarized in our holding below.”). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Nat’l Heritage Found. v. Highbourne Found., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144 at *19 (4th Cir. 2014) (“A 
debtor need not demonstrate that every Dow Corning factor weighs in its favor . . . [b]ut . . . a debtor must 
provide adequate factual support to show that the circumstances warrant such exceptional relief[.]”). 
MORBIDELLI COMMENT_PROOFS 1/14/2019 9:15 AM 
2019] THIRD-PARTY RELIEF FOR MUNICIPAL DEBTORS 241 
The facts of Dow Corning exemplify situations in which bankruptcy courts 
may release claims against third parties to assist debtors’ reorganization 
efforts.117 Faced with an unprecedented number of product liability suits, Dow 
Corning’s shareholders and insurers established a $2.35 billion fund to pay the 
company’s tort claimants.118 In return, Dow Corning’s plan of reorganization 
released the company and its shareholders and insurers from all future 
liability.119 Under the plan, claimants who decided not to settle could still litigate 
separately.120 
After articulating the Dow Corning factors, the Sixth Circuit remanded the 
case to Michigan’s Eastern District Court for additional factfinding.121 On 
remand, the district court found that all seven factors were met.122 First, Dow 
Corning and its subsidiaries, shareholders, and insurers had identical interests—
avoiding product liability claims.123 The shareholders and insurers were also 
contributing substantial assets via the settlement fund, without which Dow 
Corning would be unable to satisfy future claims.124 Moreover, by the date of 
the decision all affected classes of creditors eligible to vote on the plan had 
approved it.125 Lastly, the plan’s settlement fund ensured that substantially all 
affected classes would be paid, whether they chose to settle or litigate.126 The 
district court accordingly ruled that Dow Corning’s proposed release complied 
with the Code.127 
b. National Heritage Foundation and Gillman: Third-Party Releases That 
Fail to Conform with the Code 
The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in National Heritage Foundation v. 
Highbourne Foundation shows an application of the Dow Corning factors that 
 
 117 In re Dow Corning Corp., 287 B.R. 396, 416 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (approving the release of Dow Corning 
stakeholders from liability for defective products). 
 118 In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 653–54. 
 119 Id. at 654–55. 
 120 Id. at 655. 
 121 Id. at 658–59; In re Dow Corning Corp., 287 B.R. at 401 (noting that the bankruptcy judge recused 
himself after the Sixth Circuit ruling, prompting the district court to pick up the case). 
 122 In re Dow Corning Corp., 287 B.R. at 416. 
 123 Id. at 402–04. 
 124 Id. at 404–13 (comprising the second and third Dow Corning factors). 
 125 Id. at 413–14. 
 126 Id. at 414–16. 
 127 In re Dow Corning Corp., 287 B.R. at 416. The seventh factor, “a record of specific factual findings,” 
was satisfied by creating a record on the other six factors, so the court did not discuss it explicitly. In re Dow 
Corning Corp., 287 B.R. at 399. 
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led to the opposite conclusion.128 In National Heritage Foundation the debtor, a 
non-profit organization, included a blanket release (the “plan release”) of its 
directors and creditors (the “released parties”) from liability arising from the 
debtor’s preconfirmation activity.129 The plan release was designed to prevent 
large donors from suing the released parties for misusing donations.130 National 
Heritage Foundation (NHF) argued that the plan release was necessary because 
indemnifying the released parties would be prohibitively expensive, and without 
indemnification it would be unable to find qualified directors.131 
Although NHF’s indemnification commitments created an identity of 
interests with the released parties, the circuit court ruled that continuing to work 
for NHF did not constitute additional consideration for the plan release.132 
Without additional consideration, the directors had not made “substantial 
contribution[s]” to the reorganization.133 The court did not find the debtor’s 
“necessity” argument convincing either, pointing out that NHF could simply 
discharge its obligation to indemnify the current directors for pre-confirmation 
acts, leaving its future commitment to indemnifying directors intact.134 The court 
also refused to presume the impacted donors’ consent, because they did not have 
an opportunity to vote on the plan.135 Lastly, the plan did not compensate the 
donors at all or offer non-consenting donors an opportunity to recover.136 
Reiterating its prior holdings that such releases should be used “cautiously and 
infrequently,” the court found that the plan release was not appropriate under the 
Dow Corning factors.137 
Some circuits that do not explicitly follow Dow Corning nevertheless closely 
track its principles.138 The Third Circuit, for instance, recognizes several 
“hallmarks of permissible non-consensual releases” and imports reasoning from 
 
 128 Nat’l Heritage Found., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144, at *19. 
 129 Id at *3. 
 130 Id at *7–8. 
 131 Id at *9–13. 
 132 Id at *7–9.  
 133 Id. at *7–9. 
 134 Nat’l Heritage Found., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144, at *9–13. 
 135 Id. at *13–15. 
 136 Id. at *15–18. 
 137 Id. at *4 (citing Behrmann v. Nat’l Heritage Found., 663 F.3d 704, 712 (4th Cir. 2011)). See also 
Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 
142 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“No case has tolerated non-debtor releases absent the finding of circumstances that may be 
characterized as unique.”). 
 138 In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 658 (“[O]ur sister circuits have considered a number of factors, 
which are summarized in our holding below.”). 
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Dow Corning jurisdictions.139 In Gillman v. Continental Airlines, the circuit 
court rejected a release enjoining shareholder class-action suits against 
indemnified directors and officers of the debtor.140 The court’s rejection was 
based on the release’s lack of “fairness, necessity to the reorganization, and 
specific factual findings.”141 The plan was unfair to the class-action plaintiffs 
because it did not offer them any consideration for giving up their claims.142 It 
was unnecessary both because the directors and officers were not making any 
financial contributions crucial to the plan’s feasibility, and because the expense 
of indemnification was both highly contingent and insignificant relative to the 
debtor’s other obligations.143 
2. Third-Party Relief in Chapter 9 
While courts developed standards for third-party relief in chapter 11 
bankruptcy, very few municipalities were filing cases under chapter 9.144 
Unsurprisingly, then, municipal requests for third-party relief only began to 
appear after the recent recession and its corresponding wave of municipal 
bankruptcies.145 Although the uses of third-party relief under both chapters share 
many common characteristics, some courts have expressed reservations about 
the applicability of their chapter 11 rules to chapter 9.146 
a. Connector 2000: The Introduction of Third-Party Relief to Chapter 9 
Bankruptcy 
In re Connector 2000 was the first chapter 9 bankruptcy case to rule on third-
party relief, and its reasoning has influenced subsequent rulings on the 
subject.147 Connector 2000 was a non-profit corporation created to construct and 
 
 139 In re Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d at 214. 
 140 Id. at 216–18. 
 141 Id. at 214. 
 142 Id. at 215. 
 143 Id. at 215–17 (“we find it difficult to conceive that Plaintiffs’ lawsuits were anything more than a flea”). 
 144 From 1934 to 2012, when the recession-precipitated wave of municipal bankruptcies was already under 
way, “only forty-nine cities, counties, and towns” had filed for chapter 9 bankruptcy, although about 600 special-
purpose entities had also done so. Juliet M. Moringiello, Chapter 9 Plan Confirmation Standards and the Role 
of State Choices, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 71, 72 (2015). However, the number of cases resulting in published 
opinions is likely much lower due to dismissals.  
 145 Bankrupt Cities, Municipalities List and Map, GOVERNING (Sep. 14, 2017), http://www.governing. 
com/gov-data/municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-and-defaults.html (noting that sixty-one municipalities 
have filed for bankruptcy since 2010). 
 146 See In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 59–60 (distilling a new three-factor test based on necessity 
to the municipality’s reorganization). 
 147 See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 173–76 (invoking Connector 2000 to enunciate a rule based 
on the Dow Corning factors); Oppenheimer AMT-Free Municipals v. ACA Fin. Guar. Corp., 971 N.Y.S.2d 95, 
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administer toll roads in conjunction with South Carolina’s Department of 
Transportation (SCDOT).148 In 1998, Connector 2000 issued bonds to finance a 
road near Greenville.149 After completion, however, the toll road failed to 
generate sufficient revenue to service the bonds.150 This prompted Connector 
2000 to file for chapter 9 bankruptcy in 2010.151 
During the bankruptcy proceeding, bondholders alleged that they had causes 
of action against SCDOT for failing to maintain appropriate toll rates on the 
Greenville road, precipitating Connector 2000’s default.152 In return for 
assuming the toll road’s maintenance and releasing its claims for licensing fees 
against Connector 2000 (among other concessions), the plan of reorganization 
proposed to release SCDOT from liability to the bondholders.153 The 
bondholders, in turn, would receive smaller “Amended and Restated bonds” that 
Connector 2000 could feasibly repay.154  
The bankruptcy court did not decide whether the Dow Corning factors were 
necessary for chapter 9 cases, but nevertheless discussed them briefly.155 The 
court decided that the Dow Corning factors were satisfied because of the close 
ties between Connector 2000 and SCDOT, the quid-pro-quo nature of the 
release, and the fact that all affected classes had consented to the plan.156 It 
excused the absence of an “opt-out” clause for bondholders by reasoning that 
this factor had been intended for mass-tort situations, in which each party had a 
cause of action arising from separate facts.157  
 
99 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (acknowledging the bankruptcy court’s power to enjoin claims against non-debtors, 
although it had not done so). 
 148 In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. 752, 754 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011). 
 149 Id. (“$200,177,680 original principal amount”). 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. Despite being a nonprofit corporation, Connector 2000 qualified as a municipality under chapter 9 
because it was “subject to control by [a] public authority, state or municipal[ity]” In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 
447 B.R. at 758 (quoting Ex parte York Co. Natural Gas Auth., 238 F. Supp. 964, 976 (D.C.S.C. 1965)). 
 152 In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 766. 
 153 Id. at 766–67. 
 154 Id. at 766. 
 155 Id. at 767 (“The third party releases and injunctions contained in the Plan may be proper without regard 
to the [Dow Corning factors] because § 901 does not incorporate § 524(e). However, even applying the factors 
discussed above to this case, I find . . . that the third party releases . . . are appropriate and necessary”). 
 156 Id. at 768 (“First, . . . SCDOT owns the [toll road] and provides Debtor the right to operate the road . . 
. . Second, SCDOT and the Bondholders are providing substantial consideration critical to effectuat[ing] the 
Plan . . . . Third, the releases are necessary to support all the parties’ giving of such consideration . . . . Fourth, 
all of the impacted classes of creditors overwhelmingly support and have voted in favor of the Plan. Fifth, the 
Plan provides for the [impacted classes] to receive payment”). 
 157 In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 768. 
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Connector 2000 represents a consensual use of a third-party release in a 
situation where the difference between the debtor (Connector 2000) and the third 
party (SCDOT) was almost a technicality.158 The other parties to the release, the 
bondholders, were also directly compensated by receiving new bonds.159 These 
facts stand in stark contrast to the line of cases that followed, where proposed 
releases would harm parties potentially unrelated to the bankruptcies and benefit 
parties distinctly separate from the debtor.160 
b. The Vallejo Cases: Lawsuits Against Indemnified Municipal 
Employees Do Not Fall Within the Scope of a Municipality’s 
Discharge 
The issue of third-party relief in the context of chapter 9 surfaced again 
recently during the city of Vallejo’s bankruptcy proceeding.161 While the case 
was pending, police officer defendants in several civil rights lawsuits to which 
the city was also a party162 requested (and some received)163 the protection of 
Vallejo’s automatic stay. After the bankruptcy court confirmed the city’s plan 
of reorganization in 2011, adjusting the civil rights claims against Vallejo, 164 
the officers contended that the claims against them personally were likewise 
discharged.165 They reasoned that, because the city would be obligated to 
indemnify them under California law, the lawsuits were essentially against 
Vallejo for bankruptcy purposes.166  
 
 158 In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 754 (“The Debtor was formed to assist the South Carolina 
Department of Transportation (“SCDOT”) in the financing, acquisition, construction, and operation of turnpikes, 
highway projects, and other transportation facilities.”). 
 159 Id. at 766. 
 160 See V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *10–11; Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1139; In re City of 
Detroit, 524 B.R. at 263; In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 50. 
 161 See generally Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1136–39 (outlining the course of Vallejo’s bankruptcy from 
filing on May 23, 2008 to plan confirmation on August 4, 2011). 
 162 V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *1 (“This civil rights lawsuit . . . against the City of Vallejo . 
. . and its Chief of Police . . . alleges that the City’s police officers killed the decedent while they were using a 
taser gun during his arrest.”); Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1137 (“Plaintiffs asserted excessive-force and other 
constitutional claims against the Officers.”). 
 163 Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1136–39 (“the parties stipulated in writing that Vallejo’s bankruptcy filing 
triggered an automatic stay”); but see V.W., 20133 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *22 (quoting Maddalone v. 
Solano County, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2116 (E.D. Cal.) (“in the context of a request for a stay, claims against 
employees of bankrupt city are not claims against the bankrupt city”)).  
 164 Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1142 (citing Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1984); Ronwin v. 
Shapiro, 657 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1981)) (“[A] claim against a City official is not essentially one against the City 
for bankruptcy discharge purposes, even if state law requires the City to indemnify the official.”). 
 165 Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1139; V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *10–11. 
 166 Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1141 (citing CAL. GOVERNMENT CODE § 825(a), obligating a public entity “to 
indemnify its employees for judgments against the employees based upon employee acts or omissions arising 
within the scope of employment”); V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *10–11. 
MORBIDELLI COMMENT_PROOFS 1/14/2019 9:15 AM 
246 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 35 
In both cases, the district court and the Ninth Circuit rejected these 
arguments, holding that the lawsuits were not against the city, and were therefore 
not discharged in bankruptcy.167 The district court achieved this result in V.W. 
by extending to bankruptcy the rule that a federal lawsuit against a state 
employee “is not essentially one against the state” for purposes of sovereign 
immunity.168 The court noted that Vallejo’s “indemnification obligation[s] 
w[ere] arguably discharged by the bankruptcy.”169 
The court also discussed an “alarming” result regarding indemnified 
employees and the § 523(a)(6) exception to discharge.170 Bankruptcy courts 
have often held that claims arising from injurious civil rights violations are non-
dischargeable “debts . . . for willful and malicious injury” in individual 
bankruptcies.171 However, chapter 9 does not incorporate that exception, which 
in any case applies only to individual debtors.172 Thus, shielding city employees 
from liability using third-party releases would essentially circumvent federal 
civil rights and bankruptcy laws.173 The court unfortunately declined to rule on 
this issue.174 
In Deocampo, the Ninth Circuit implicitly endorsed the V.W. court’s 
reasoning. It began by establishing that, because chapter 9 does not incorporate 
11 U.S.C. § 524(e),175 its holdings barring third-party relief under chapter 11 did 
not necessarily translate to chapter 9.176 Even so, the court used the same rule as 
V.W. to hold that the lawsuits were not claims against the city.177 Lastly, the 
court examined Vallejo’s plan of reorganization and found that it lacked an 
 
 167 Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1136; V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *24.  
 168 V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *21. 
 169 Id.; but cf. Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1145 (noting that, because Vallejo did not actually become obligated 
to the officers until after the plan confirmation date, their claims against the city for indemnification were not 
discharged). 
 170 V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *8–10 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012)). 
 171 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012) and its application in In re Gee, 173 B.R. at 193). 
 172 V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *8 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012), referencing chapters 7, 
11, 12, and 13, but not chapter 9). 
 173 Id. (“This extraordinary result would appear to exalt the bankruptcy laws over the civil rights laws 
(even though the civil rights laws, like the bankruptcy laws, are anchored in the constitution).”). See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012). 
 174 V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *8–10. 
 175 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) (“discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other 
entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.”); 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (“Applicability of other 
sections of this title”). 
 176 Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1143 (holding that its reasoning in In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1401 
precluding third-party relief in chapter 11 “does not apply in Chapter 9 proceedings”). 
 177 Id. at 1142–43 (citing Demery, 735 F.2d at 1147 and holding that its analysis of “the attribution of 
liability between public entities and their officers” in the context of sovereign immunity “is equally applicable” 
to bankruptcy). 
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“express”178 release of the officers from liability, “supported by specific factual 
findings.”179 
c. Detroit: The Grand Bargain and Indemnified Police Officers 
Detroit’s chapter 9 bankruptcy is the country’s largest to date.180 In its plan 
of reorganization, the city proposed multiple third-party releases.181 It attempted 
to release the claims that civil rights plaintiffs (the “§ 1983 creditors”) were 
asserting against indemnified police officers, as in Vallejo.182 Detroit also asked 
to release the state of Michigan from liability for claims relating to Detroit’s 
endangered pension funds.183 The latter resembled Connector 2000 in that it was 
part of a mostly-consensual deal that benefitted all parties, including those 
whose claims would be impaired.184  
Detroit pointed to Connector 2000 as proof that the Dow Corning factors 
were inapplicable to chapter 9 bankruptcy.185 It relied on the opinion’s remark 
that, if § 524(e) made the Dow Corning factors necessary, its absence in chapter 
9 bankruptcy could make them unnecessary.186 The Detroit court immediately 
rejected this argument without discussing the merits of the factors themselves, 
reiterating the Sixth Circuit’s stance that § 524(e) has no implications for third-
party relief.187 Accordingly, it evaluated each proposed release under the Dow 
Corning factors.188 
 
 178 Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1144 (citing In re Applewood Chair Co., 203 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 2000)). 
 179 Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1144 (citing Behrmann, 663 F.3d at 712–13). 
 180 See generally Zoe Thomas, Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 INT’ FIN. L. REV. 17 (2015); Scott A. Krystiniak, 
From Wreckage Comes Reason: How Detroit’s Chapter 9 Filing Helps Develop a Practicable and Principled 
Good Faith Standard, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 235, 256–64 (2015). 
 181 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 172, 262–63. 
 182 Id. at 262–63 (summarizing “lawsuits seeking damages against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and 
“against the City’s officers in their individual capacity.”). 
 183 Id. at 172 (“[E]ach holder of a pension claim releases the State and its related entities from all liabilities 
arising from or related to the City, this case, PA 436, or article IX, § 24 of the Michigan constitution.”). 
 184 Id. at 174–75 (“[T]he release and injunction are essential to the reorganization of the City[,] . . . the 
impacted classes have overwhelmingly voted to accept the plan[, and] . . . the plan provides a mechanism to pay 
a substantial portion of the claims in the classes affected by the release.”). 
 185 Id. at 173 (citing In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 767 (“The third party releases and injunctions 
contained in the Plan may be proper without regard to the [Dow Corning factors] because § 901 does not 
incorporate § 524(e).”)). 
 186 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 173 (citing In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 767 (“The third 
party releases and injunctions contained in the Plan may be proper without regard to the [Dow Corning factors] 
because § 901 does not incorporate § 524(e).”)). 
 187 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 173 (citing In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657). 
 188 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 172, 262–63. 
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The pension plan release was a component of the “Grand Bargain” struck 
between Michigan, Detroit, and Detroit’s claimholders to provide for the city’s 
pensioners and save its extensive art collection.189 Some pensioners claimed that 
Michigan’s constitution gave them a cause of action against the state for 
deficiencies in their pension funds.190 In return for contributing almost $200 
million to rescue the pension funds, Michigan asked to be formally released from 
liability for any claims arising from the funds.191 This agreement, along with 
significant philanthropic contributions made through the Detroit Institute of 
Arts, made the Grand Bargain possible.192 
Analogizing these facts to Connector 2000, the court quickly determined that 
all Dow Corning factors except the “opt-out” provision were satisfied, and 
approved the pension plan release.193 Although it nominally accepted Dow 
Corning, the court also invoked Highbourne’s statement that “[a] debtor need 
not demonstrate that every . . . factor weighs in its favor to obtain approval of a 
non-debtor release” as authority to adapt the factors to chapter 9.194 Recognizing 
the Dow Corning factors’ origins in mass-tort liability in business bankruptcies, 
the court further noted that “[m]uch debate could be had regarding which of the 
. . . factors should apply in a chapter 9 case and whether any other factors should 
apply.”195 This uncertainty forms the basis for the relaxed standards applied later 
in the opinion and in San Bernardino.196 
As in the Vallejo cases, Detroit was obligated to indemnify its police officers 
for damages awarded to civil rights plaintiffs. Here, however, the city’s 
obligation stemmed from a contract it assumed under the plan of 
 
 189 Id. at 169–70.  
 190 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 170 (citing MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 24). 
 191 Id. at 169–70. The plan would also halt any ongoing litigation against Michigan on account of the 
pension funds.  
 192 Id. For an overview of the Detroit Institute of Arts’ role in the Grand Bargain, see generally Collins, 
supra note 50. 
 193 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 174–75 (“First, . . . [t]he City is a political arm of the State . . . created 
to further the objectives of the State . . . . Second, the State is contributing substantial assets to the reorganization 
. . . . Third, the release and injunction are essential to the . . . Grand Bargain, which . . . is the cornerstone of the 
City’s plan . . . . Fourth, the impacted classes have overwhelmingly voted to accept the plan . . . . Fifth, the plan 
provides a mechanism to pay a substantial portion of the claims in the classes affected by the release[.] Finally, 
. . . this opinion contains the specific findings of facts supporting the Court’s conclusion that the non-consensual 
releases . . . are appropriate.”). 
 194 Id. at 174 (quoting Nat’l Heritage Found., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144, at *6). 
 195 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 174. 
 196 See id. at 266 (holding Dow Corning’s fourth (“essential to reorganization”) factor alone to be 
dispositive in rejecting a third-party release); In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 57–58 (enunciating a 
three-factor test based on Detroit, requiring a release to be express, integral to reorganization, and supported by 
specific factual findings). 
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reorganization197 instead of a statute. Detroit’s plan of reorganization also 
specifically proposed to discharge the officers from individual liability, citing 
“the effective and efficient functioning of the police department” as 
consideration for the releases.198 Accordingly, upon the § 1983 creditors’ 
objection, Detroit “attempted to distinguish [V.W.] on the grounds that the 
Vallejo plan did not include a discharge or release of claims against officers.”199 
The court rejected Detroit’s argument using its modified Dow Corning 
rule.200 The Dow Corning opinion stated that a “bankruptcy court’s power to 
order a third-party release is based on its ‘power to reorder creditor-debtor 
relations needed to achieve a successful reorganization.’”201 Thus, the Detroit 
court went a step further and reasoned that the “necessity” factor alone could be 
determinative.202 Finding that the city had not established that its proposed 
release was “essential to the success of the City’s plan,” the court sustained the 
§ 1983 creditors’ objection.203 In doing so, the court acknowledged that it was 
“effectively creat[ing] a class of creditors that will be paid in full” but held that 
this was a proper result.204 Because Detroit had voluntarily assumed the 
underlying contract in its plan of reorganization, it was bound to comply with 
the terms it had negotiated.205 
d. San Bernardino: The Necessity Standard Emerges 
San Bernardino’s bankruptcy, the most recent chapter 9 case to bring up 
third-party relief, follows directly from Vallejo and Detroit. The city was 
obligated to indemnify a group of police officer defendants against judgments 
entered against them for civil rights violations.206 Like in Vallejo, the city’s 
 
 197 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266–67. 
 198 Id. at 266 (“[T]he City responds that its plan properly seeks to release [the § 1983] claims.”). 
 199 Id. at 265–66. 
 200 Id. at 266 (adopting the third factor from the test for third-party relief used in In re Dow Corning Corp., 
280 F.3d 648). 
 201 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266 (emphasis added). 
 202 Id. at 266–67. 
 203 Id. (“Absent demonstrated necessity, the bankruptcy code does not allow the impairment and discharge 
of unsecured claims against third parties . . . [t]herefore, the Court sustains the § 1983 creditors’ objections.”). 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. (“[A] debtor’s assumption of an executory contract requires the debtor to comply with the contract 
. . . and presumably the City entered into the contract and assumed it precisely because it concluded that it is 
mission-justified.”). 
 206 In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 49–50 (“Civil Rights Claimants who … asserted litigation 
claims not only against the City but also against it employees acting in the normal course of their employment, 
in particular members of the Police Department . . . . At the time of confirmation . . . , the City had approximately 
115 lawsuits pending against it and more than 200 other Claimants who had . . . not yet initiated litigation. More 
than half of the lawsuits and many of the other Claimants asserted claims against the Indemnified Parties.”). 
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obligations arose from California law regarding public employee 
indemnification,207 and similar to Detroit, the city reaffirmed its obligations in 
the plan as a result of collective bargaining agreements it reached with 
employees.208  
San Bernardino, apparently learning from its predecessors, provided for an 
injunction in its plan of reorganization (“the plan injunction”).209 The plan 
injunction would “shield the City’s employees, specifically its police officers, 
from litigation exposure and liability for damages of Claimants who alleged the 
officers had violated their civil rights.”210 The plan injunction was expressly 
featured211 and accompanied by specific factual findings that the city would not 
be able to afford its proposed annual budgets without the plan injunction.212 
These findings included the city’s unsuccessful attempts to eliminate its 
operating deficit by “dramatically reduc[ing] expenses and work[ing] diligently 
to increase revenues” and its decision to allocate “additional funds of $56.5 
million over five years” to implement a “Police Resources Plan” targeting the 
city’s high crime rates.213 
The bankruptcy court agreed,214 first citing the Ninth Circuit in Deocampo 
that third-party relief was not per se impermissible under chapter 9.215 The court 
next combined the Deocampo and Detroit reasoning into a three-part test, 
permitting third-party relief under chapter 9 if the injunction is: “(i) . . . express; 
(ii) . . . an integral part of the reorganization; and (iii) . . . supported by specific 
 
 207 In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 50 (noting that CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(a), among other state 
statutes, obligates municipalities “to indemnify their employees for claims against them arising from the scope 
of their employment, such indemnification to cover both the costs of defense and any damage award against the 
employee”). 
 208 Id. at 51 (“The settlements the City negotiated with its employee unions and the operative collective 
bargaining agreements required the City to reaffirm its obligation to indemnify the employees . . . in the Plan.”). 
 209 Id. at 49. 
 210 Id. at 50 (citing San Bernardino’s plan providing that “[e]ntities who have held, hold, or may hold Pre-
Confirmation Date Claims shall be permanently enjoined from . . . commencing or continuing in any manner, 
directly or indirectly, any suit, action or other proceeding of any kind against . . . any or all of the Indemnified 
parties or any of their property . . .” and defining “litigation claims” to include “lawsuits against any of the 
Indemnified Parties, whether filed prior to the Confirmation Date or on or after the Confirmation Date based on 
acts, claims or omissions that occurred or arose prior to the Confirmation Date, as to which lawsuits the City . . 
. becomes obligated to pay any judgment arising therefrom . . .”). 
 211 In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 59 (“the Plan Injunction was expressly set forth in the Plan . 
. . as required by the [Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3016(c)] applicable to third-party injunctions”). 
 212 Id. at 59–61. 
 213 Id. at 60–61; see also In re City of San Bernardino Cal., 499 B.R. 776, 778–79 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013) 
(describing the city’s financial hardships leading up to its bankruptcy filing). 
 214 In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 59 (“[T]he first[,] . . . second[,] and third factors are . . . 
satisfied.”). 
 215 Id. at 57–58 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1143; 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012)). 
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factual findings216 regarding [its necessity] to the City’s efficient and effective 
functioning, to its revitalization, or to the success of the plan.”217  
Using this standard, the court found that the plan injunction was express and 
featured sufficient “specific factual findings.”218 The feasibility of the city’s 
proposed annual budgets was also enough of a “necessity” to satisfy the second 
and third factors’ substantive requirements.219 Additional facts favoring 
confirmation included the city employees’ cooperation in negotiating collective 
bargaining agreements and accepting reduced payouts on their claims, the plan’s 
“narrow tailor[ing]” to “only” enjoin collection on the judgments, not the 
lawsuits themselves, and an insurance settlement that would provide some 
compensation for claimants with “catastrophic injuries.”220 The court concluded 
hopefully that, with its plan injunction in place, San Bernardino could “turn 
around its fiscal crisis, provide sufficient municipal services to its residents, and 
make the streets safe for economic development and greater personal 
prosperity.”221 
II. ANALYSIS 
The necessity-based standard for third-party relief that has developed in 
recent chapter 9 cases is improper for two reasons. First, it opens a loophole for 
parties related to municipal debtors to be relieved of otherwise non-
dischargeable debts, contravening congressional intent as embodied in the 
Code’s exceptions to discharge. Second, it removes any objective limitations on 
third-party relief by eliminating key Dow Corning factors and by ignoring the 
difficulties of measuring necessity without a municipal liquidation option. The 
Dow Corning factors already guide courts to approve third-party releases 
consistent with the Code and offer the experience of over thirty years of case 
law. Nevertheless, circumstances common to municipal bankruptcies may 
suggest adjustments to certain factors, as the courts in Connector 2000 and 
Detroit noted.222  
 
 216 In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 58 (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3016 requiring “specific and 
conspicuous language” for plan injunctions “against conduct not otherwise enjoined under the Code”). 
 217 Id. at 57–58 (citing In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266; Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1144–45). 
 218 In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 59–60. 
 219 Id. at 56 (“The unrefuted evidence . . . shows that the City does not and will not have the funds necessary 
to both pay the judgments against the City’s employees and invest in the Police Resources Plan, among other 
things.”). 
 220 Id. at 61–62. 
 221 Id. at 63. 
 222 In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 768; In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 174. 
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As an initial matter, the V.W. court speculated that Vallejo’s obligations to 
indemnify its officers might themselves have been dischargeable in 
bankruptcy.223 If so, similarly situated municipalities will have no case for a 
third-party release’s necessity to begin with. As the Detroit court pointed out, a 
debtor that voluntarily assumes indemnification obligations instead of 
discharging them has only itself to blame for the financial consequences.224  
Of course, a debtor could argue in the alternative that indemnification is 
necessary for recruitment. San Bernardino, for instance, predicted that its police 
department would be unable to hire or retain officers unless they were shielded 
from liability.225 However, the court in Highbourne refuted this same argument 
with respect to the company’s directors.226 It pointed out that discharging the 
debtor’s existing obligations in bankruptcy did not affect its commitments going 
forward.227 The reorganized debtor would retain its policy of indemnifying 
directors, so future directors would still expect to be indemnified.228 In the same 
way, California’s indemnification statute still applies to San Bernardino post-
bankruptcy, so police officers can count on being indemnified in the future.  
Nevertheless, this Comment continues with the assumption that 
indemnification obligations cannot readily be discharged except through third-
party relief. This allows this Comment to address the arguments that parties have 
and probably will continue to rely on, absent rulings that directly address the 
treatment of statutory indemnification obligations in bankruptcy. 
A. Granting Relief to Non-Debtors for Non-Dischargeable Debts is 
Inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code 
Although the court in V.W. worried that releasing officers from liability for 
civil rights judgments was contrary to federal policy, none of the other chapter 
9 opinions considered that the officers’ debts would not be dischargeable had 
they filed for bankruptcy individually.229 This is not entirely surprising, as 
 
 223 V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *21. 
 224 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266–67 (“[A] debtor’s assumption of an executory contract requires 
the debtor to comply with the contract . . . and presumably the City entered into the contract and assumed it 
precisely because it concluded that it is mission-justified.”). 
 225 In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 55–56. 
 226 Nat’l Heritage Found., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144, at *9–13. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. 
 229 V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *8 (“This extraordinary result would appear to exalt the 
bankruptcy laws over the civil rights laws (even though the civil rights laws, like the bankruptcy laws, are 
anchored in the constitution).”). 
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outside of chapter 9 no case appears to have addressed third-party releases of 
nondischargeable debts. Chapter 9’s omission of the § 523(a) exceptions, 
expanding the scope of a debtor’s discharge, also indicates that Congress 
considered municipal rehabilitation to be paramount.230 However, there is no 
indication that Congress intended for third-parties to share in this “super-
discharge” merely by association with the debtor. The case law surrounding 
§ 523(a) instead shows an intent to keep individuals who have incurred certain 
kinds of debt from receiving the benefit of the bankruptcy discharge. 
1. Third-Party Relief is Justified by the Code’s “Fresh Start” Policy 
One of the bankruptcy system’s central goals is to provide the debtor—
whether an individual, a business entity, or a municipality—with the opportunity 
to start over, unimpeded by the effects of its past financial mistakes.231 This idea, 
commonly called the “fresh start,” underlies a history of Code provisions and 
case law that favors dischargeability and construes provisions to benefit the 
“honest but unfortunate” debtor.232 Thus, even though the Code makes no 
mention of a bankruptcy court’s ability to release third-parties from debts, many 
courts have interpreted § 105(a)’s broad grant of equitable power to encompass 
such relief.233 But because courts are limited in exercising this power to carrying 
out the Code’s provisions, § 105(a) does not give them free reign to release third 
parties.234 
When the debtor is an entity instead of an individual, many non-debtors may 
also be burdened by obligations arising from their relationship with the debtor. 
For instance, a corporation’s directors may face liability for misusing funds, or 
a municipality’s police officers for injuries caused in the line of duty.235 All else 
equal, the debtor would prefer to simply release its directors or officers from 
liability so that they can continue to serve without the distraction of litigation. 
 
 230 See V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *8 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012), referencing chapters 
7, 11, 12, and 13, but not chapter 9). 
 231 Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286–87 (“[I]n the same breath that we have invoked this fresh start policy, we 
have been careful to explain that the Act limits the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning 
to the honest but unfortunate debtor.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 232 Id.; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.05 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) 
(“[T]he exceptions should be . . . strictly construed against the objecting creditor and liberally in favor of the 
debtor.”). 
 233 In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 565. 
 234 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); see In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 565. 
 235 See, e.g., Nat’l Heritage Found., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144 (denying debtor non-profit 
organization’s proposed release of its directors from potential liability for misusing donations). 
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However, such a release may contravene the Code by treating the directors’ or 
officers’ creditors unfairly, placing it outside the debtor’s reach. 
To this end, courts have developed standards, such as the Dow Corning 
factors, to limit third-party relief to situations in which it is instrumental to the 
debtor’s fresh start and consistent with the Code’s provisions.236 Mass tort 
claims against indemnified parties tend to fall here, because the number and 
amounts of claims may be difficult to estimate, exposing the debtor to uncertain 
obligations going forward.237 Although a debtor can discharge its duty to 
indemnify, it may need the indemnified parties to contribute substantially to the 
reorganization. If, for example, the debtor instead establishes a settlement fund 
to pay the claims, releasing third parties from personal liability can secure their 
cooperation without treating creditors unfairly. This result is desirable because 
the debtor has a better chance of recovery, and allowable because it is consistent 
with the Code. 
2. The § 523(a) Exceptions Overrule the General Policy Favoring 
Dischargeability 
Congress has decided that individuals who incur debts through certain types 
of “wrongful acts” cannot use laws enacted to help the “honest but unfortunate” 
debtor to discharge those debts.238 Although courts construe these excepted 
categories narrowly, they enforce the exceptions rigorously.239 For instance, the 
Supreme Court found that a creditor who accused a debtor of fraud (excepted 
under § 523(a)(2)(A)) but settled before trial could still show that the debt arose 
from non-dischargeable conduct.240 And courts have repeatedly found that debts 
arising from civil rights violations fall under the § 523(a)(6) exception for 
injuries caused by “willful and malicious conduct.”241 
 
 236 In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 565 (justifying its ruling under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012)’s grant 
of “power to take appropriate equitable measures needed to implement other sections of the Code.”). 
 237 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648 (granting debtor manufacturer’s request to release 
parties from product liability as a “quid pro quo” for contributions to a settlement fund). 
 238 Radwan, supra note 28; Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286–87. 
 239 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.05 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) 
(“[T]he exceptions should be . . . strictly construed against the objecting creditor and liberally in favor of the 
debtor.”). 
 240 Archer, 538 U.S. at 323 (holding that although a “settlement agreement and releases may have worked 
a kind of novation, . . . that fact does not bar [the creditor] from showing that the settlement debt arose out of 
false pretences [sic], a false representation, or actual fraud, and consequently is nondischargeable.”). 
 241 See, e.g., In re Gee, 173 B.R. at 193 (concerning sex discrimination); Avery v. Sotelo (In re Sotelo), 
179 B.R. 214, 218 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1995) (concerning sexual harassment); In re Moore, 1 B.R. 52, 54 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1979) (concerning racial discrimination).  
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A bankruptcy court cannot use its equitable powers in ways that are contrary 
to the Code’s provisions, and the Code indicates a clear policy that certain debts 
should not be discharged.242 Although § 523(a)’s exceptions only explicitly 
apply to debtors, the Code only contemplates releasing debtors from debts in the 
first place. Without a provision granting bankruptcy courts the ability to release 
third parties from debts, there would be no reason to include language limiting 
that ability. Courts already agree that the Code’s silence on third-party relief 
does not grant them free reign to use it—hence the Dow Corning-based 
standards. Requiring debtors’ requests for third-party relief to follow some of 
the Code’s relevant requirements but not others is inconsistent and vulnerable to 
abuse.  
Through this limited application of the restrictions on dischargeability, 
recent cases have suggested a loophole through which nondischargeable debts—
here arising from civil-rights violations—may be indirectly discharged.243 
Although these cases are brought under chapter 9, the reasoning is equally 
applicable in any chapter of the Code. For example, a business owner who faces 
liability for obtaining money through fraud (excepted by § 523(a)(2)), could not 
discharge that liability by filing for bankruptcy as an individual.244 However, the 
same person could direct his or her business to file for bankruptcy under chapter 
11, and include a release of the same liability in its plan of reorganization. Of 
course, this plan would only work in circuits that allow third-party relief, and it 
would need to satisfy the requirements of the circuit in which the business is 
located. Nevertheless, it opens a possible end-run around the policies built into 
the Code. While the beneficiaries of such releases are not technically “debtors”, 
they are receiving the benefits of the bankruptcy discharge for debts which 
Congress has explicitly excepted from discharge.245 Because the court’s 
equitable powers are limited by the Code, and releasing nondischargeable debts 
is contrary to its provisions, bankruptcy courts’ equitable powers do not extend 
to releasing non-debtors from debts excepted by § 523(a). 
 
 242 A bankruptcy court’s powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012) are limited to enforcing the Code’s 
provisions. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 565. On non-dischargeable debts, see Grogan, 498 U.S. 
at 287; Radwan, supra note 28. 
 243 Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1143; In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266–67; In re City of San Bernardino, 
566 B.R. at 56.  
 244 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2018) (applying to discharges obtained under chapters 7 and 13). 
 245 Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287. 
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B. The Necessity Standard is Inappropriate for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy 
Third-party relief is not limited to the areas of products liability and insider 
indemnification in chapter 11 cases, and municipal debtors will likewise find 
many uses for it under chapter 9.246 The releases involving state liability to 
municipal creditors, as in Connector 2000 and the pension fund release in 
Detroit, have been consensual and mutually-beneficial.247 Accordingly, both 
releases easily satisfied the Dow Corning factors.  
On the other hand, the releases of municipal employees have been 
constructed primarily to benefit those employees, at the expense of parties 
potentially unrelated to the bankruptcy.248 After Detroit and San Bernardino, the 
precedent concerning this second category conditions relief on its “necessity” to 
the reorganization.249 While a municipality’s request for third-party relief must 
also be clearly displayed in its proposed plan of reorganization and accompanied 
by “specific factual findings” of necessity, these requirements are merely 
procedural and do not rely on the debtor’s underlying situation.250  
This “necessity” standard is problematic because it is neither consistent with 
prior case law nor specifically adapted to the needs of municipal debtors. 
Necessity, in particular, lacks teeth when the municipality cannot face 
dissolution.251 This uncertainty encourages municipal debtors to over rely on 
third-party releases, once reserved for unusual circumstances, instead of 
addressing their own obligations. 
 
 246 See In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. 752 (approving consensual plan releasing state Department 
of Transportation from claims of municipal debtor’s bondholders). 
 247 Id. at 768; In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 174–75. 
 248 Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1139; V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *10–11; In re City of Detroit, 
524 B.R. at 263; In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 50. 
 249 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266–67; In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 57–58; Deocampo, 
836 F.3d at 1144–45. 
 250 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266–67; In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 57–58; Deocampo, 
836 F.3d at 1144–45. 
 251 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has upheld municipal debt adjustment legislation . . . at least in part on the premise that 
the legislation involves no possibility of . . . liquidation of [a municipality’s] assets.”); In re Richmond Unified 
School Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 225 (1991) (“A municipal unit cannot liquidate its assets to satisfy its creditors[.] 
. . . Therefore, the primary purpose of Chapter 9 is to allow [it] to continue operating while it adjusts or refinances 
its creditor[s’] claims”). 
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1. Third-Party Relief is a Dramatic Measure Reserved for Unusual 
Circumstances 
Chapter 9, like other chapters of the Code, centers around adjusting a 
debtor’s obligations to its creditors.252 The Code provides bankruptcy courts 
with various tools that can accomplish this, including the authority to use 
equitable remedies (such as temporary and permanent injunctions) under 
§ 105(a).253 However, “[s]ection 105 is not an independent source of 
jurisdiction,” and must be exercised subject to the Code’s provisions254 and the 
other limits on equitable remedies.255 Furthermore, equitable doctrines 
traditionally restrict the use of injunctions to extraordinary situations where 
there is “no adequate remedy at law.”256 Courts on both sides of the circuit split 
have acknowledged that this doctrine influences third-party relief in bankruptcy, 
rendering it a “dramatic measure” reserved for “unusual circumstances.”257 
Early in its opinion, the Detroit court rejected the argument that, because 
chapter 9 does not incorporate § 524(e), the Dow Corning factors were 
irrelevant.258 It noted that, under Sixth Circuit law, § 524(e) only limited the 
scope of the debtor’s discharge.259 Releasing third parties from debts did not 
expand the debtor’s own discharge, so § 524(e) was never an obstacle to third-
party relief.260 Accordingly, the court held that Dow Corning applied equally to 
chapters 9 and 11.261 Acknowledging that individual factors could hold different 
relevance in chapter 9, and aided by the example of Connector 2000, it found 
 
 252 In re Addison Community Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. at 649 (“The general policy considerations underlying 
. . . chapter 9 are the same as [those] of chapter 11 reorganization: to give the debtor a breathing spell from debt 
collection efforts and establish a repayment plan with creditors.”). 
 253 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”). 
 254 Celotex Corp., 514 U.S. at 327 (citing 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick & 
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) (“Section 105 is not an independent source of jurisdiction, but rather it 
grants the courts flexibility to issue orders which preserve and protect their jurisdiction”)); Norwest Bank 
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (“whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts 
must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 255 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.03[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) 
(“Statutes Affecting the Availability of Injunctive Relief”). 
 256 Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 530, 550 (2016). 
 257 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3 at 658; In re American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d 621, 626–27 
(9th Cir. 1989). 
 258 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 173 (citing In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648). 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. 
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the plan injunction’s lack of necessity to be dispositive.262 Detroit, therefore, 
should not be read to introduce a new standard for third-party relief. 
The Detroit court’s holding is relevant to this analysis for two additional 
reasons. First, it shows that third-party relief remains a “dramatic measure” 
reserved for “unusual circumstances” in chapter 9, as it is in chapter 11.263 
Second, the court points out that the Dow Corning factors are not the only 
considerations limiting third-party relief—the Code’s plan confirmation 
requirements, namely “good faith” proposal of and “fair and equitable” 
treatment under a plan, always apply.264 
However, although the San Bernardino court purported to follow the 
reasoning in Detroit, it did not consider the applicability of the other Dow 
Corning factors.265 Instead, it interpreted the single factor that proved sufficient 
to reject a request for third-party release in Detroit as the sole substantive 
requirement.266 This new standard constitutes a break from precedent without 
any reasoning supporting its particular applicability to chapter 9 bankruptcy or 
limitations reserving third-party relief for unusual circumstance. 
2. The Necessity Standard Imposes no Substantive Limitations on the 
Availability of Third-Party Relief 
The indissolubility of municipalities means that no chapter 9 plan is 
“necessary” in the chapter 11 sense—that is, the municipality will continue to 
function until the state dissolves it, regardless of what happens in bankruptcy.267 
This leaves the bankruptcy court without an objective measure of necessity, 
forcing it to base its decision upon some other criterion. For instance, the San 
Bernardino court substituted the feasibility of the city’s proposed budget.268 
 
 262 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 173 (citing In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648). 
 263 In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658. 
 264 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 173. 
 265 In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 57–58. The court inadvertently incorporated the seventh Dow 
Corning factor, the procedural requirement that findings be supported by findings of fact, from Deocampo, 836 
F.3d at 1144 (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3016). See In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648. 
 266 In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 57–58. 
 267 See In re Addison Community Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. at 649 (quoting “[N]either Congress nor the 
courts can change the existing system of government in this country . . . . One of the powers reserved to the 
states is the power to create and govern municipalities.”); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[1] (Alan N. 
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has upheld municipal debt adjustment 
legislation . . . at least in part on the premise that the legislation involves no possibility of . . . liquidation of [a 
municipality’s] assets.”). 
 268 In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 56 (“The unrefuted evidence . . . shows that the City does not 
and will not have the funds necessary to both pay the judgments against the City’s employees and invest in the 
Police Resources Plan, among other things.”). 
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That measure is problematic because it does not need to reflect anything about 
the municipality’s underlying financial situation.  
Any budget can presumably allocate the entirety of a municipality’s 
expected income for purposes other than indemnification. And if the budget 
leaves no room for indemnification, indemnifying employees will jeopardize its 
success. Under the San Bernardino court’s formulation, this almost-tautological 
relation, combined with factual findings about the municipality’s dire financial 
straits, could be sufficient to secure releases for the debtor’s employees, and 
deny compensation to victims of civil rights violations. The lack of an objective 
measure of necessity therefore transforms the necessity standard into an exercise 
in budget drafting.  
In other words, the debtor has a conflict of interests. The bankruptcy court 
may have an idea of the municipality’s future earning potential but relies on the 
municipality to accurately project its “necessary” expenses. The possibility of 
pushing some costs onto third parties (in this case by leaving civil rights 
plaintiffs uncompensated) creates a “use-it-or-lose-it” budgeting problem.269 If 
the debtor doesn’t ask for third-party relief, it will be effectively shrinking its 
own budget. In similar circumstances involving conflicts of interests, courts 
have avoided interpreting Code provisions in ways that allow debtors to control 
the narrative. For example, courts in many circuits prevent debtors from 
gerrymandering classes of creditors in chapter 11 to meet the Code’s consent 
requirements.270 This policy is based on judicial recognition that debtors have 
an incentive to act in ways that are inconsistent with fundamental bankruptcy 
principles, rather than any particular Code provision.271 
When the availability of third-party relief depends primarily on the story a 
debtor can tell, failing to request it is like leaving money on the table. Future 
municipal debtors thus have every incentive to emulate the San Bernardino plan. 
And they would appear to be eligible if they can produce budgets disposing of 
all projected revenues, explicit requests for third-party relief, and factual 
 
 269 See generally Jeffrey B. Liebman & Neale Mahoney, Do Expiring Budgets Lead to Wasteful Year-End 
Spending? Evidence from Federal Procurement 1 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 
19481, September 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19481.pdf. 
 270 Russell M. Blain & Daniel R. Fogarty, Paths and Obstacles to Chapter 11 Confirmation: Artificial 
Impairment, Gerrymandering, and Section 1111(b) 16 (Southeastern Bankruptcy Law Center Seminar, 2014), 
available at http://www.sbli-inc.org/archive/2014/documents/Paths_and_Obstacles_to_Chapter_11_ 
Confirmation_etc.pdf. 
 271 Id. 
MORBIDELLI COMMENT_PROOFS 1/14/2019 9:15 AM 
260 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 35 
findings about the crucial roles of the indemnified employees.272 All are 
procedural limitations that a debtor may be able to satisfy regardless of its 
underlying need. In practice, the necessity standard would impose no substantive 
limitations on many municipal debtors. 
3. The Necessity Standard Fails to Reserve Third-Party Relief for Unusual 
Circumstances 
The ubiquity of police indemnification alone suggests that many future 
municipal debtors will follow Detroit’s and San Bernardino’s leads.273 
However, third-party relief is by no means limited to indemnified police officers. 
Any indebted public employee who is making ongoing, substantial contributions 
to a city’s operation by virtue of his or her employment is eligible for the same 
treatment. In an extreme case, indebted officials could even send their own 
municipal employer into an unnecessary bankruptcy proceeding solely to free 
themselves or their businesses from nondischargeable debts, or to save 
themselves the embarrassment of declaring bankruptcy individually. 
These examples suggest a few of the countless situations in which a debtor 
municipality can (and has every incentive to) request third-party relief. 
Assuming its plan of reorganization satisfies the procedural requirements, the 
necessity standard gives no reason to deny these requests. The fundamental 
objection to the necessity standard, then, is that it does not limit third-party relief 
to unusual circumstances. This subverts the roles of both bankruptcy, as a forum 
for adjusting the relations between the “honest but unfortunate” debtor and its 
creditors,274 and equitable remedies, as extreme solutions to problems for which 
the law does not adequately provide.275 If bankruptcy courts wish to limit third-
party relief in accordance with bankruptcy and equitable principles, they must 
look to something other than the necessity standard. 
 
 
 272 In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 57–58 (citing In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266; 
Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1144–45). 
 273 See Schwartz, supra note 30 (revealing results of a nationwide study indicated that “police officers are 
virtually always indemnified,” although often by unofficial arrangements). 
 274 In re Addison Community Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. at 649 (“The general policy considerations underlying 
. . . chapter 9 are the same as [those] of chapter 11 reorganization: to give the debtor a breathing spell from debt 
collection efforts and establish a repayment plan with creditors.”); Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286–87. 
 275 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (internal quotations omitted) (“Because such an 
injunction is a dramatic measure to be used cautiously, . . . enjoining a non-consenting creditor’s claim is only 
appropriate in unusual circumstances.”). 
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C. An Appropriate Standard for Third-party Relief in Chapter 9 Must 
Impose Substantive Limitations 
The Code restricts the dischargeability of certain debts, and equitable 
doctrines limit a court’s ability to approve creative solutions to a debtor’s 
financial woes. In the realm of third-party relief, standards such as the Dow 
Corning factors help to ensure that plans of reorganization conform with both 
legal and equitable principles. Recently, courts have questioned the suitability 
of Dow Corning for chapter 9 bankruptcies. The alternative that has emerged—
the necessity standard—fails to restrict third-party relief in accordance with the 
Code. This section explains why the Dow Corning factors remain applicable. It 
also considers legislative options for removing the uncertainty surrounding 
third-party relief and protecting indemnified public employees. 
1. The Dow Corning Factors 
The seven Dow Corning factors consider whether (1) “[t]here is an identity 
of interests” between the debtor and non-debtor, (2) “[t]he non-debtor has 
contributed substantial assets,” (3) the release “is essential to reorganization,” 
(4) the impacted class has accepted the plan, (5) the plan would pay the impacted 
class, as well as (6) allow objecting claimants to opt out, and (7) the bankruptcy 
court has made “a record of specific factual findings.”276 All of these factors 
remain relevant to chapter 9 bankruptcy, including the sixth, which has received 
the most criticism.277 
As an initial matter, the seventh factor (a “record of specific factual 
findings”) is required by Bankruptcy Rule 3016 for plan injunctions “against 
conduct not otherwise enjoined under the Code.”278 The merits of a factual 
record have not been questioned in any case involving third-party relief. Far 
from it, courts following Dow Corning have specifically noted its practical 
importance in the event of an appeal.279 
The first Dow Corning factor, the existence of “an identity of interests 
between the debtor and the third party,” is a source of the bankruptcy court’s 
authority to release claims against third-parties.280 The effect of plan 
confirmation in chapter 11 is to bind the debtor, its owners, and its creditors to 
 
 276 In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658.. 
 277 In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 768; In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 174–75. 
 278 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3016.  
 279 In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 653 (remanding due to lack of specific factual findings). 
 280 Id. at 658. 
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the plan’s terms.281 The Code defines a creditor as an “entity that has a claim 
against the debtor,” and a debtor as an entity “concerning which a case under 
this title has been commenced.”282 Thus, unless a claim is essentially against the 
debtor, the claimholder is not a “creditor,” and a plan of reorganization is not 
binding with respect to that claim.283  
Although the effect of plan confirmation in chapter 9 is also to bind the 
“debtor and any creditors” to its terms, the inapplicability of § 524(e) 
complicates the picture.284 The result, however, is the same. Assuming 
§ 524(e)’s omission is not superfluous suggests that in some instances 
discharging a municipality’s debt can also affect a non-debtor’s liability. 
However, a court applying this interpretation must nevertheless find that a debt 
is the municipality’s debt in the first place.285 This leaves the task of determining 
which debts are the municipality’s. The court could either take a literal approach 
or consider, as the Dow Corning court did, debts that are nominally against non-
debtors but essentially against the municipality.286 Either way, the result will be 
at least as restrictive as the first Dow Corning factor. 
The fourth and fifth Dow Corning factors would remain relevant to 
municipal bankruptcy if only because chapter 9 provides few other safeguards 
of non-debtors’ rights.287 The factors require some combination of impacted 
parties’ consent to their treatment under a plan of reorganization, and 
compensation for giving up their claims.288 The Code requires a municipality’s 
plan to be in its creditors’ best interests, meaning that its treatment is preferable 
to their non-bankruptcy options.289 Although the parties affected by third-party 
releases need not be creditors, the first Dow Corning factor and the situations in 
which such releases arise generally ensure that this will be the case.290 
 
 281 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (2018). 
 282 11 U.S.C. § 101(10), (13) (2018). 
 283 See, e.g., Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1136; V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *24. 
 284 11 U.S.C. § 944(a) (2018); 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2018) (“[D]ischarge of a debt of the debtor does not 
affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.”). 
 285 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2018). 
 286 In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (“There is an identity of interests between the debtor and 
the third party, usually an indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the non-debtor is, in essence, a suit 
against the debtor.”). 
 287 See Tyson, supra note 34. 
 288 In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658. 
 289 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[7][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010); 
see Pryor, supra note 47 (discussing municipal creditors’ remedies outside of bankruptcy). 
 290 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (“There is an identity of interests between the debtor 
and the third party, usually an indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the non-debtor is, in essence, a suit 
against the debtor.”). See, e.g., In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 766 (bondholders with claims against 
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With respect to claims against a municipality directly, almost anything is 
better than the creditors’ nonbankruptcy options, because creditors cannot 
usually force a municipality to liquidate or raise additional revenue.291 However, 
an indemnified third party—such as a municipal employee—does not receive 
the same protections.292 With respect to its own creditors, an indemnified party 
is no different than any other debtor. Creditors can obtain judgment liens on its 
assets, garnish its wages, and possibly force it into bankruptcy. Parties impacted 
by a third-party release are giving up real rights to payment and must be 
compensated accordingly. Otherwise, the plan is not in their best interests. Thus, 
the fourth and fifth Dow Corning factors remain a meaningful measure of plan 
confirmability in chapter 9 bankruptcy.293 
The courts in both Connector 2000 and Detroit noted that the sixth (opt-out) 
factor may be of limited usefulness in municipal bankruptcy.294 This position 
appears to be based on the bankruptcy policy that a creditor has no right to select 
which of two equal sources of payment will satisfy its claim.295 In the context of 
mass product liability suits where third-party relief originated, each injured 
party’s claim could be based on entirely different circumstances and harms.296 
Those differences could result in vastly different damage judgments if the claims 
were litigated instead of settled. Thus, because some plaintiffs could recover 
much more (or less) by litigating, forcing all of them into the same settlement 
would not be the equivalent of choosing between equal sources of repayment.  
With § 1983 civil rights claims, however, the opt-out factor finds new 
relevance for chapter 9 bankruptcies. As with products liability claims, the facts 
and injuries are specific to each plaintiff, with damage awards varying 
accordingly.297 A bankruptcy court, then, cannot rely upon its authority to direct 
 
both debtor and state); In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 170 (pensioners with claims against both debtor and 
state). 
 291 See Parker, 590 F.2d at 653 (noting the “well-understood and established” principle “that it is contrary 
to public policy to allow private liens on public property”); In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 215 (citing Faitoute 
Iron & Steel Co., 316 U.S. at 510).  
 292 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) (“An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title . . . only if such 
entity . . . is a municipality.”). 
 293 In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658; 11 U.S.C. § 943(7) (2018). 
 294 In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 768; In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 174–75. 
 295 See In re A.H. Robbins Co., 880 F.2d at 701 (“A creditor has no right to choose which of two funds 
will pay his claim. The bankruptcy court has the power to order a creditor who has two funds to satisfy his debt 
to resort to the fund that will not defeat other creditors.”). 
 296 See In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 768. 
 297 Schwartz, supra note 30, at 892 (citing City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“like 
other tort causes of action, it is designed to provide compensation for injuries arising from the violation of legal 
duties, and thereby, of course, to deter future violations.”)). 
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creditors between equal sources of repayment when it forces civil rights 
plaintiffs to accept the same payout (or lack thereof). As in chapter 11 cases, it 
must either insist that civil rights claimants have the ability to opt out of a third-
party release or find a different source of authority for mandating equal 
treatment.  
Dow Corning’s second and third factors consider whether the non-debtor has 
contributed substantial assets and whether protecting the debtor from indirect 
liability is essential to the reorganization.298 They reflect that a bankruptcy 
court’s equitable power is based on a remedy’s necessity to carrying out the 
Code’s provisions.299 This suggests that the factors are interchangeable to some 
degree—indeed, courts have considered releases justified primarily by either 
one.300 Regardless, § 105(a), the Code provision granting courts necessity-based 
equitable powers, applies to both chapters 9 and 11 equally.301 
The “necessity” standard’s single substantive factor is like Dow Corning’s 
second and third factors.302 However, as this Comment has argued, it must 
instead measure necessity against something other than the municipality’s 
ability to continue operating, such as its proposed budget. This narrower 
characterization completely misses the point of necessity: determining whether 
a release falls within the court’s equitable powers under § 105(a).303 Because 
municipalities cannot face failure in the same way as businesses, this 
determination will remain difficult and highly subjective in chapter 9 
bankruptcies. However, basing third party relief on a municipality’s budgeting 
skill does not justify a court’s use of its equitable power either. 
 
 298 In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658. 
 299 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2018). 
 300 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 287 B.R. at 404–13 (release intended to secure on non-debtor 
contributions to reorganization); Nat’l Heritage Found., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144, at *9–13 (release 
intended to shield debtor from indemnification expenses). 
 301 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2018); 11 U.S.C. § 103(a), (f) (2018) (applying chapter 1 to chapters 11 and 9, 
respectively). 
 302 Compare In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 57–58 (considering “the necessity of the injunction 
to the City’s efficient and effective functioning, to its revitalization, or to the success of the plan.”), with In re 
Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (“Whether . . . [t]he non-debtor has contributed substantial assets to the 
reorganization [and whether the] injunction is essential to reorganization, namely, the reorganization hinges on 
the debtor being free from indirect suits against parties who would have indemnity or contribution claims against 
the debtor.”). 
 303 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2018). See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266.  
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2. Legislative Alternatives 
Congress ultimately determines whether and in what circumstances 
bankruptcy courts should grant relief to third parties. Its policies as they are 
currently expressed in the Code speak against granting third-party relief for 
nondischargeable debts. But because so few bankruptcy cases have been brought 
under chapter 9, many of its provisions are still unexplored and open for 
interpretation. Doctrines developed elsewhere but not prohibited by the Code or 
chapter 9, like third-party relief, will become better fitted to municipalities’ 
needs as new cases arise. Considering that Congress has tolerated conflicting 
standards for third-party relief in chapter 11 for several decades, there is no 
reason to expect that it will amend the Code to provide a definite standard for 
chapter 9 any time soon.  
However, state legislatures have every incentive to proactively address the 
plight of public servants in bankruptcy. The widespread indemnification of 
police officers suggests that the public values both compensating victims of civil 
rights violations and encouraging officers to zealously enforce the law. State 
governments can support these values without interposing their sovereign 
immunity by, for example, assuming insolvent municipalities’ obligations to 
indemnify employees.304 This solution would resemble Detroit’s Grand Bargain, 
where Michigan rescued underfunded pension funds. The consideration given to 
parties whose rights are affected would make any such plan more likely to satisfy 
the Dow Corning factors. 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter 9 was a relatively quiet corner of bankruptcy law until the wave of 
filings precipitated by the last recession gave it a national spotlight. Likewise, 
third-party relief in municipal bankruptcy has risen from a hypothetical to a 
highly desirable option due to widespread public employee indemnification. The 
first cases to address third-party relief raised the possibility that it will be 
generally available to municipal debtors as a means of discharging their 
employees’ otherwise non-dischargeable debts. The lack of an objective 
measure of necessity or other limiting factors gives the “necessity” standard 
more bark than bite, ignoring third-party relief’s role as a “dramatic measure.” 
This incentivizes municipalities to leave the less-palatable solutions of adjusting 
 
 304 Sovereign immunity extends to states and entities acting as “arms of the state.” Northern Ins. Co., 547 
U.S. at 193. However, a suit against an indemnified employee is not a suit against a state for purposes of 
sovereign immunity. V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *21. 
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their own future spending or indemnification obligations untouched, leading to 
results at odds with bankruptcy policy. The discharge of debts excepted under 
§ 523(a) is also problematic because it is at odds with congressional policy as 
expressed in the Bankruptcy Code. Regularly approving third-party releases of 
these debts would carve out a wide exception to § 523(a) that Congress has 
shown no intention of creating. 
An appropriate standard for chapter 9 should include substantive limitations 
on the availability of third-party relief. A categorical ban would accomplish this 
but would also narrow the scope of discharge beyond what the Code demands, 
denying some debtors a useful remedy. The seven Dow Corning factors, on the 
other hand, provide an appropriate balance and have the advantage of already 
being accepted by most jurisdictions in the chapter 11 context. The existing case 
law also provides precedent on releasing corporate officers and directors from 
liability that can guide analogous municipal plan provisions. Ideally, a standard 
for third-party relief would point bankruptcy courts to truly unusual 
circumstances for municipal debtors and encourage municipalities to explore 
every option for resolving their own obligations directly before turning to those 
of third parties. 
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